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Notes
The Real Party Under Rule 17(a): The Loan
Receipt and Insurers' Subrogation Revisited
Suppose Jones is reading the latest issue of Exercise Today
in her home in Minnesota, when she comes across an advertise-
ment for the Uniflex Fitness Machine. Deciding she must own
one, she calls the toll-free number to place an order. After tak-
ing her name and address, the voice at the other end of the
telephone informs her that shipping will be arranged through
Bob's Shipping and Hauling based in Wisconsin. The voice then
asks Jones if she would like to insure the shipment through
America's Largest Insurance Company. She answers
affirmatively.
Weeks later, the Uniflex Fitness Machine arrives. Jones
acknowledges receipt by signing the bill of lading. Upon open-
ing the crate, she discovers the equipment is damaged. She sub-
mits a claim to America's Largest. America's Largest
investigates the claim and discovers that Bob's Shipping was
negligent in handling the crate. Jones is not interested in re-
covering in tort from Bob's Shipping, she just wants to receive
her policy proceeds from America's Largest. By paying on the
policy, America's Largest is subrogated to Jones' claim against
Bob's Shipping; consequently, America's Largest has standing
to sue Bob's Shipping for damaging Jones' machine. When sub-
rogation was first incorporated into the common law, America's
Largest could bring suit in Jones' name so the complaint would
read Jones v. Bob's Shipping and Hauling.' Under modern
real-party-in-interest statutes, however, such as Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(a), America's Largest must bring suit in its
own name so the complaint reads America's Largest Insurance
Co. v. Bob's Shipping and Hauling.2
1. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (providing that "[e]very action shall be prose-
cuted in the name of the real party in interest"); infra note 10 and accompany-
ing text.
In federal court, jurisdiction over this hypothetical case would be based on
diversity of citizenship because Jones and Bob's Shipping are citizens of differ-
ent states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1988); see also id § 1332(c) (stating that
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America's Largest prefers bringing suit in Jones' name to
avoid any prejudice jurors may have against large insurance
companies. To achieve this result under Rule 17(a), America's
Largest and Jones enter into a loan receipt agreement, under
which the payment due Jones on the policy is characterized as
a loan.3 The loan is repayable only from amounts Jones recov-
ers from Bob's Shipping, and America's Largest conducts the
suit against Bob's Shipping for her. In other words, Jones re-
covers as if America's Largest had paid on the policy in the
usual fashion, but because America's Largest technically loaned
Jones the money, subrogation is not involved and the complaint
will read Jones v. Bob's Shipping and Hauling.
This hypothetical illustrates the use of loan receipt agree-
ments, which insurers commonly use to avoid bringing suit in
their own names.4 Federal circuit courts disagree whether
monies transferred under loan receipt agreements are loans, in
which case the insurer need not be joined as a party in a subse-
quent lawsuit, or payments, in which case the insurer is subro-
gated to the rights of the insured and must be joined as a real
party in interest in a subsequent lawsuit.5 The case law does
little to reconcile this conflict, and indeed, creates confusion in
this area of law.
This Note analyzes the various approaches used by courts
in determining what effect should be given to the loan receipt
device. Part I examines subrogation, Rule 17(a), and federal
loan receipt case law. Part H critiques the analysis of the cases
addressing the validity of loan receipts, and exposes the flaws
in those decisions that have upheld the validity of the loan re-
ceipt. The Note concludes that the loan receipt agreement is
invalid as a device to avoid joinder under Rule 17(a), except in
"a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been in-
corporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business"). If
America's Largest is incorporated in Wisconsin or has its principal place of
business there, it lacks diversity of citizenship in its suit against Bob's Ship-
ping. See id § 1332(a)(1), 1332(c). This situation suggests another use of the
loan receipt: to create diversity jurisdiction. By bringing suit in Jones' name,
America's Largest could take advantage of Jones' Minnesota citizenship. For a
more detailed discussion of the effect of the loan receipt on diversity jurisdic-
tion, see Comment, The Loan Receipt and Insurers' Subrogation-How to Be-
come the Real Party in Interest Without Really Lying, 50 TUL. L. REV. 115,
123-24 (1975).
3. See infra notes 53, 67 (providing examples of loan receipt
agreements).
4. See, eg., American Dredging Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 309 F. Supp. 425,
427 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
5. See infra note 60.
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the traditional context of insurer's contingent liability where
the insurer has a valid purpose for avoiding joinder other than
avoiding perceived jury prejudice against insurance companies.
I. LOAN RECEIPT AGREEMENTS AND THE REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST
A. SUBROGATION
At common law, when an insurer paid money to its insured
in satisfaction of an insurance claim, the subrogee (insurer)
could not bring suit against a party liable to its insured. 6 Subro-
gation developed as an equitable doctrine7 that allowed the in-
surer to bring suit on its insured's claim against the wrongdoer
in the name of the insured.8
Real-party-in-interest statutes changed this process by
prohibiting parties lacking equitable interests to sue.9 If the in-
surer has already paid the insured's claim, only the insurer has
an interest in recovering from the wrongdoer. Thus, the in-
surer is the real party in interest.10 Under these statutes, when
6. Note, Subrogation: Proper Party Plaintif in Action Against Tort-Fea-
sor, 7 S.C.L.Q. 463, 464 (1955).
7. I& at 463. Some commentators argue that insurer subrogation is not
an appropriate equitable remedy. One writer points out that insurers receive
windfalls because insurance premiums are not reduced based on anticipated
recovery. Hasson, Subrogation in Insurance Law-A Critical Evaluation, 5
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 416, 418, 422 (1985). He then outlines a statute
designed to abolish subrogation in most areas of insurance. Id at 417, 436-38.
Another commentator argues that health insurers should be denied subroga-
tion in personal injury cases. Procaccia, Denying Subrogation in Personal In-
jury Claims: A Needed Change of Direction, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 93, 116
(1973). Courts should allow accident victims to recover from both the insurer
and the tortfeasor because a single insurance recovery only rarely achieves ac-
tual indemnity. Id. at 94.
8. See Note, Insurance-Loan Receipt-Real Party in Interest, 24 N.Y.U.
L.Q. REV. 171, 171 (1949); see also 18 G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES,
COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 74:389, at 824 (rev. 2d ed. 1983) (al-
luding to "the common-law requirement of suit by the subrogated insurer in
the name of the injured claimant"). The insurer may still bring suit in the
name of the insured in jurisdictions lacking real-party-in-interest provisions
similar to Rule 17(a). 16 G. CouCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, supra,
§ 61:27, at 107.
For a more detailed treatment of the history of subrogation, see Note,
supra note 6, at 463-66.
9. See, eg., FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a); see also Note, supra note 6, at 464-65.
10. See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 380-81
(1949); 3A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.09[2.-1]
(1989); 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1546 (1990). As one insurance expert explains:
Under modern statutes abolishing the distinction between law and eq-
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a wrongdoer injures an insured, the insurer typically pays the
insured under the terms of the insurance policy. The insurer
then must use its own name if it elects to sue the wrongdoer on
its insured's claim.'
B. RULE 17(a)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) is the federal real-
party-in-interest statute.-2 It requires that "[e]very action shall
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."'13 Con-
sequently, in the typical situation in which an insurer pays pro-
ceeds to its insured under an insurance policy without
executing a loan receipt agreement, Rule 17(a) requires the in-
surer to sue in its own name.14
uity and requiring that actions be brought in the name of the real
party in interest, it is generally held that an insured who has been
paid in full by his [or her] insurer is not the real party in interest and
is not entitled to bring an action in his [or her] own name against the
third-party tortfeasor but that the action must be brought by the in-
surer who by virtue of subrogation becomes the only real party in
interest.
18 G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, supra note 8, § 74:379, at 817. If an
insurer makes only a partial payment, both the insurer and the insured are
real parties in interest. Aetna, 338 U.S. at 381.
11. Aetna, 338 U.S. at 381.
12. Rule 17(a) reads:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an
express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has
been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
may sue in that person's own name without joining the party for
whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute of the United
States so provides, an action for the use or benefit or another shall be
brought in the name of the United States. No action shall be dis-
missed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objec-
tion for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, join-
der, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had
been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
13. I&
14. See supra note 10. If an action is not brought in the name of the real
party in interest, Rule 17(a) provides for joinder or substitution of the real
party, or for ratification of the action by the real party. FED. R. CIv. P. 17(a).
Courts have held in accordance with this rule that although the insurer is the
real party in interest, the insurer need not be joined or substituted in an action
brought by the insured; the insurer can merely ratijy commencement of the
action by the insured. See Stouffer Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 88 F.R.D. 336, 337
(E.D. Pa. 1980); cf. Urrutia Aviation Enters. v. B.B. Burson & Assocs., 406 F.2d
769, 770 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (upholding ratification of commencement
of action between assignor and assignee); Southern Nat'l Bank v. Tri Fin.
[Vol. 74:11071110
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Rule 17(a) helped to merge "law and equity by adopting
Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1173, 1188 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (upholding ratification of com-
mencement of action between plaintiff and bank that loaned funds to plain-
tiff), aff'd and vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Southern Nat'l
Bank v. Croteo, Inc., 458 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1975). In Southern National Bank
the ratification was a letter submitted to the court. I&i at 1187.
In Stoqffer, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania presented the typical argument for allowing ratification. See Stouffer,
88 F.R.D. at 337. The court looked to the purpose of Rule 17(a) as explained in
the advisory committee notes and concluded that the main purpose behind
Rule 17(a) is to protect the defendant from subsequent litigation. I& Because
ratification protects the defendant from subsequent litigation, the court rea-
soned that joinder of the insurer was unnecessary. Id.
The Stouffer court addressed only part of the advisory committee notes.
After discussing the purpose behind allowing a reasonable time to join the real
party before dismissing the action, the notes continue:
Modern decisions are inclined to be lenient when an honest mis-
take has been made in choosing the party in whose name the action is
to be filed-in both maritime and nonmaritime cases. The provision
should not be misunderstood or distorted. It is intended to prevent
forfeiture when determination of the proper party to sue is difficult
or when an understandable mistake has been made.
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) advisory committee note (1966) (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted). Whenever an insurer uses ratification to avoid suit in its own
name, the insurer is not within the ambit of the advisory committee notes'
"honest mistake" as to who is the real party in interest. A leading commenta-
tor on the federal rules concurs in this analysis. 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILER &
M. KANE, supra note 10, § 1555, at 415 (the last sentence of Rule 17(a) applies
only when "necessary to avoid injustice"). Wright, Miller and Kane criticize
the Stouffer interpretation of "ratification," noting that the
reference to 'ratification' in Rule 17(a) seems to be a carryover from
the original draft of the sentence added in 1966, which was to apply
only to certain maritime proceedings, and probably was intended to
adopt the procedure in salvage actions by which nonparties seek their
share of the recovered property. Nonetheless, some federal courts
have interpreted the word to validate an arrangement by which the
real party in interest authorizes the continuation of an action brought
by another and agrees to be bound by its result, thereby eliminating
any risk of multiple liability.
I& at 417 (citing Southern Nat7 Bank, 317 F. Supp. at 1186-88; Urrutia Avia-
tion, 406 F.2d at 770).
Some courts have paid attention to the advisory committee's intention to
limit the scope of permissible substitution and relation back. See Crowder v.
Gordons Tranps., Inc., 387 F.2d 413, 418-19 (8th Cir. 1967) (allowing relation"
back when a reasonable basis existed for plaintiff's mistake in initially bring-
ing the action in the name of the administratrix); cf. Pace v. General Elec. Co.,
55 F.R.D. 215, 217, 219 (W.D. Pa 1972) (allowing ratification rather than join-
der of the insurers as real parties in interest when the defendant's motion was
not seasonably made).
Commentators and courts have not addressed what seems to be the cen-
tral issue within ratification: whether the ratification agreement can be re-
vealed to the jury. If an insured is prosecuting an action for the benefit of its
insurer pursuant to a ratification agreement, the complaint should presumably
read Insured ex rel. Insurer v. Wrongdoer. Cf. Ingram ex rel. St. Paul Fire &
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the rule of equity that the plaintiff should be the party with the
substantive right sought to be enforced."'15 One policy reason
for adopting the rule in equity rather than the rule at law16 is
to recognize the equitable interest of the subrogee.17 The in-
surer should be forced to bring suit in its own name because
once it pays the insured, only the insurer has an interest in re-
covering the money paid. Suit in the name of the insurer thus
avoids the legal fiction that the insured always maintains a pe-
cuniary interest in recovery from the alleged wrongdoer.
Commentators often cite two other policies supporting
Rule 17(a). The requirement that every action be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest enables the defendant to
avail itself of all evidence and defenses it would have against
the real party in interest."" It also ensures finality of judg-
ment.19 These policy reasons appear in the Advisory Committee
Marine Ins. Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum, 112 F. Supp. 430, 431 (M.D. Tenn.
1953) (stating that in the absence of the loan receipt as an exhibit, the suit
would proceed as an ordinary subrogation action). This would reveal the iden-
tity of the insurer as the real party in interest and thus make ratification a
moot alternative to joinder or substitution. The last sentence of Rule 17(a) is
more logically consistent under this interpretation. If the insurer controls the
litigation, and if both the insurer and the insured have a pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the litigation, the insurer should be joined. If the insurer con-
trols the litigation and only the insurer has a pecuniary interest in the out-
come, the insurer should be substituted. Finally, if the insured controls the
litigation but the insurer also has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
litigation, the insurer could ratify commencement of the action. As long as the
ratification agreement is reflected by appending "ex rel. Insurer" to the plain-
tiff insured's name, joinder, substitution, and ratification all will result in iden-
tification of the real party in interest. Thus, ratification would not be a
loophole to avoid Rule 17(a).
15. Comment, supra note 2, at 118; see also 6 C. MILLER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 21.09, at 462 (rev. 3d ed. 1988) (stating that Rule 17(a)
is "a literal rescript of" former Federal Equity Rule 37, which required every
action to be brought in the name of the real party in interest); Kessner, Fed-
eral Court Interpretations of the Real Party in Interest Rule in Cases of Subro-
gation, 39 NEB. L. REV. 452, 453 (1960) (stating that "adoption of the rule was
an acceptance of the equity doctrine that he who has the right is the person to
pursue the remedy").
16. See supra text accompanying note 6.
17. See 3A J. MOORE & J. LucAs, supra note 10, % 17.09(2.-1), at 17-77
n.2.
18. E.g., Celanese Corp. of Am. v. John Clark Indus., 214 F.2d 551, 556
(5th Cir. 1954); 6 C. MILLER, supra note 15, § 21.10, at 463.
19. Finality of judgment - the protection of defendant from multiple
suits arising from a single cause of action - is not relevant to this Note be-
cause "[w]here the insured, after receiving money from the insurer under a
loan receipt transaction, recovers in an action from the alleged wrongdoer, the
insurer is barred from bringing an independent action against the wrongdoer."
16 G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, supra note 8, § 61:87, at 161-62; see
[Vol. 74:11071112
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on Rules' Notes to the 1966 Amendment to Rule 17(a).20
Application of Rule 17(a) is complicated by the necessity of
deciding whether to apply state or federal law in determining
the real party in interest.2' This is a matter of some contro-
versy.22 Although determination of the real party in interest is
also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979) (stating that when a
non-party assumes control of a party's litigation, the non-party is precluded
from relitigating the claims litigated in the first action).
20." In explaining why "[n]o action shall be dismissed on the ground that it
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable
time has been allowed... for ... joinder... of [] the real party in interest[]"
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a), the advisory committee alluded to the policy behind
adoption of the real-party-in-interest rule:
In its origin the rule concerning the real party in interest was permis-
sive in purpose: it was designed to allow an assignee to sue in his [or
her] own name. That having been accomplished, the modern function
of the rule in its negative aspect is simply to protect the defendant
against a subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover,
and to insure generally that the judgment will have its proper effect
as res judicata.
FED. R. CIV. P. 17 advisory committee note (1966).
21. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
22. Of course, federal courts must apply the appropriate state law to de-
cide substantive issues, but procedural issues can be resolved by federal law.
Id. Thus, the issue is whether determination of the named plaintiff is a proce-
dural or a substantive issue. The federal courts in the following cases involv-
ing loan receipts decided that determining the real party in interest is a
substantive issue, and, accordingly, applied state law: Keystone Shipping Co.
v. Home Ins. Co., 840 F.2d 181, 183 n.6 (3d Cir. 1988); McNeil Constr. Co. v.
Livingston State Bank, 300 F.2d 88, 90 n.5 (9th Cir. 1962); Tyler v. Dowell, Inc.,
274 F.2d 890, 894 (10th Cir.), cerL denied, 363 U.S. 812 (1960); Childers v. East-
ern Foam Prods., 94 F.R.D. 53, 55 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Stouffer Corp. v. Dow
Chem. Co., 88 F.R.D. 336, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1980); See v. Emhart Corp., 444 F.
Supp. 71, 73-74 (W.D. Mo. 1977); White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of
Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd without opinion
sub anom. Quaglia v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 578 F.2d 1375, and af'd
without opinion, 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978); Northern Assurance Co. of Am.
v. Associated Indep. Dealers, 313 F. Supp. 816, 818 (D. Minn. 1970); Rosenfeld
v. Continental Bldg. Operating Co., 135 F. Supp. 465, 470 (W.D. Mo. 1955); see
also E. Brooke Matlack, Inc. v. Walrath, 24 F.R.D. 263, 268 (D. Md. 1959) (rec-
ognizing that the real party in interest is determined by state law). In other
cases involving loan receipts, the federal courts determined the real party in
interest based, at least in part, on federal procedural law. See infra note 60.
Keystone Shipping illustrates the essential problem with the line of fed-
eral cases applying substantive state law. After noting that the insurers are
actually the real parties in interest, the federal district court looked to Penn-
sylvania law, which allowed suit in the name of the insured under a loan re-
ceipt. Keystone Shipping, 840 F.2d at 183 n.6. The court concluded that
Pennsylvania "insurance" law controlled; that is, suit in federal court would be
in the name of the insured. Id
The Keystone Shipping court did not actually apply Pennsylvania insur-
ance or substantive law. Once the federal court acknowledges that the insur-
ers are the real parties in interest, a state court's decision to allow prosecution
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based on substantive state law, the determination of the party
in whose name the action should be brought is a matter of fed-
eral procedural law.23 The right to subrogation thus arises
in the name of the insured is a matter of state procedural law, not state insur-
ance law. See, e.g., Robertson v. White, 113 F.R.D. 20, 23 (W.D. Ark. 1986); 6A
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 10, § 1544, at 345. In other
words, when state law gives one party a cause of action in the name of another
party, federal courts recognize the cause of action but use federal law to deter-
mine the procedural issue of the party in whose name the action should be
brought.
No state law should substantively provide that the insured is the real
party in interest, because the insured retains no pecuniary interest in the liti-
gation after issuance of a loan receipt. A state court's decision to allow the in-
surer to sue in the name of the insured is, therefore, inherently procedural.
Even if state law does recognize the insured as the real party based on some
non-pecuniary interest, the insurer's pecuniary interest would presumably re-
quire that the federal suit be in the names of both insured and insurer. Cf.
United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 381-82 (1949)
(holding that in cases of partial subrogation - when the insurer has paid only
part of the claim - suit should be in the name of both insured and insurer).
Distinguishing the federal procedural issue from the state substantive is-
sue can sometimes produce astonishing results. In a 1983 case, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Alabama held that the insured was the
real party in interest based on earlier Fifth Circuit decisions purportedly ap-
plying Alabama state law upholding loan receipt validity. Industrial Dev. Bd.
v. Brown & Root, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 58, 59 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (citing Ketona Chem.
Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 404 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1968); Sanders v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 354 F.2d 777, 778 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1965)), qff'd in part without
opinion, 795 F.2d 87 (11th Cir. 1986). But see infra note 66 (stating that
Ketona found no Alabama law on point); Sanders, 354 F.2d at 778 & n.1
(although an Alabama case is at the end of a string citation of federal author-
ity, the Sanders court did not purport to apply Alabama law). Since the Fifth
Circuit decisions, Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) had been modified to
provide that the insurer is the real party despite the use of a loan receipt. In-
dustrial Dev. Bd., 99 F.R.D. at 59. The district court determined that Alabama
substantive law remained unchanged. The court reasoned that because the
federal courts are not bound by state procedural law, the insured remained
the real party in interest under Alabama law! IH. at 59-60.
Whether determination of the real party in interest should be based on
federal procedural or state substantive law could be the subject of a separate
Note. This Note focuses on the issue of whether courts should allow loan re-
ceipt agreements to alter the function and purpose of real-party-in-interest
statutes such as Rule 17(a).
23. 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MiER & M. KANE, supra note 10, § 154, at 345.
As Wright, Miller and Kane explain:
Finally, it should be noted that the question of who is the real party
in interest should be distinguished from the question of in whose
name an action may be brought. State law may provide that a partic-
ular plaintiff has a cause of action but that the claim should be prose-
cuted in the name of another party. In that situation the federal
court will allow the claim to be asserted by plaintiff since he has a
substantive right under state law, which makes him the real party in
interest for purposes of Rule 17(a). In short, the question of in whose
1114
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under substantive state law, but as a procedural matter, the
federal statute requires suit in the name of the party with the
substantive right.24
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOAN RECEIPT
In the hypothetical case of Jones, America's Largest, and
Bob's Shipping, the loan receipt let America's Largest gain the
benefits of subrogation without bringing suit in its own name,
thus circumventing Rule 17(a).2 The loan receipt evolved,
however, as a device designed to remedy a very different
problem.26
1. Carrier Beneficiary and Third Party Liability Clauses
Insurers developed loan receipt agreements in response to
commercial practices of the 1800s. Toward the end of that cen-
tury, carriers of goods began to insert "carrier beneficiary"
clauses into their shipment contracts.27 These provisions made
the carrier the beneficiary of the shipper's insurance. If the
carrier damaged the shipper's goods, the payment from the in-
surer to the shipper would settle any claim the shipper had
against the carrier.28 Because the shipper no longer had a
claim against the carrier, the insurer could not invoke subroga-
tion to recover its insurance payment from the carrier, even if
the carrier was negligent.29
To illustrate these principles, return to the Jones hypothet-
ical and suppose Bob's Shipping inserted the following carrier
beneficiary clause in the bill of lading- "In case of any damage
done to the shipper's goods for which the carrier is liable to the
shipper, the carrier shall have the full benefit of any insurance
name the action should be brought is a procedural one and should be
governed by the federal rules.
Id (footnotes omitted).
24. 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 10, § 1544, at 345.
25. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
26. For a more detailed discussion of the history of the loan receipt, see
Comment, supra note 2, at 115-17.
27. Id at 115 (citing . HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND
PRACTICE 68 (1964)).
28. Id.
29. Id The following is a typical carrier beneficiary clause: "the carrier
so liable shall have the full benefit of any insurance that may have been ef-
fected upon or on account of said goods." See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & W.
Transp. Co., 117 U.S. 312, 314, 320 (1886). The Court upheld this clause in
Phoenix. Id. at 325-27.
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that may have been effected upon the shipper's goods."'  Bob's
Shipping then damages Jones' Fitness Machine. In the first
case, assume Jones would rather sue Bob's Shipping than col-
lect the proceeds of her insurance policy with America's Larg-
est. In this case, the insurance is not "effected" in the sense
that Jones has recovered no money under the policy. Bob's
Shipping must pay Jones' court judgment despite its carrier
beneficiary clause. America's Largest now owes no money to
Jones because Jones' recovery from Bob's Shipping prevents
Jones from filing an insurance claim.31
In the normal case, however, Jones will file a claim, and
America's Largest will pay on the policy. If Jones subsequently
sues Bob's Shipping, the court will not allow her to keep any
payment on the judgment.32 If she sues anyway, Bob's Ship-
ping will defend based on the carrier beneficiary clause in the
bill of lading, asserting its right to the "full benefit of any in-
surance."-' Jones cannot maintain an action for the damages
compensated by insurance.s4
In the usual case, Jones will not sue Bob's Shipping once
she has received the insurance proceeds. Rather, America's
Largest will subrogate itself to Jones' claim. Under subroga-
tion, America's Largest has the same claim against Bob's Ship-
ping that Jones would have had;S that is, America's Largest is
bound by the carrier beneficiary clause on the bill of lading.3
Thus, Bob's Shipping would defend based on the carrier benefi-
ciary clause, and America's Largest could not recover the insur-
ance proceeds paid to Jones.3 7
Insurers responded to carrier beneficiary clauses by in-
30. See supra note 29, infra note 51 (both providing other examples of
carrier beneficiary clauses).
31. See Howarth v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 34, 36 (8th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam) (holding that insured cannot recover from insurer after recover-
ing from tortfeasor).
32. See National Garment Co. v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 173 F.2d 32,
35 (8th Cir. 1949) (stating that the insured must hold the recovery in trust for
the insurer); 16 G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, supra note 8, § 61:29,
at 109 (same).
33. See supra text accompanying note 30.
34. See Phoenix, 117 U.S. at 325.
35. See id- at 321; 16 G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, supra note 8,
§ 61:114, at 183-84; Comment, supra note 2, at 115.
36. See supra note 35.
37. Phoenix, 117 U.S. at 325; cf. 16 G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES,
supra note 8, § 61:114, at 183-84 (stating that the insurer has the same claim
against the wrongdoer as the insured).
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serting third party liability clauses in their insurance policies. 1
These clauses provided that the insurer owed no money to an
insurance policy claimant until the liability of all potentially li-
able parties had been determined in court.39 The liability of the
insurer under the policy thus became contingent on the liability
of third parties to the claimant.40
Returning to the Jones hypothetical, suppose Bob's Ship-
ping included a carrier beneficiary clause in its bill of lading.
Further suppose America's Largest anticipated shipment on a
bill of lading containing a carrier beneficiary clause by includ-
ing the following third party liability clause in Jones' insurance
policy: "America's Largest will not make payment to the in-
sured until the liability, if any, of any and all third parties to
the insured has been first determined."41 After Bob's Shipping
damaged her Fitness Machine, Jones would file a claim. Under
the third party liability clause, America's Largest could prop-
erly delay payment until Jones' suit against Bob's Shipping was
settled or went to judgment. In fact, if Jones' suit is successful,
Jones' recovery would extinguish the policy claim, and
America's Largest would never pay on the policy.42
2. Luckenbach and the Loan Receipt Agreement
Third party beneficiary clauses relieved insurers of imme-
diate liability for goods shipped on bills of lading containing
carrier beneficiary clauses. This is not the result the insurers
sought. The insurers merely wanted to compensate the insured
without losing their subrogation rights, and developed loan re-
ceipt agreements with that purpose in mind.43 Using this de-
vice, when the shipper filed a claim with its insurance company
for the damaged cargo, the amount the insurer paid on the pol-
icy was considered a loan to the shipper.44 The shipper was ob-
ligated to repay the loan only if and to the extent it was able to
38. See, e.g., Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Refining Co., 248 U.S.
139, 146 (1918); infra note 52.
39. See, e.g., Luckenbach, 248 U.S. at 146. The third party liability clause
in Luckenbach also provided specifically that the insurer was not liable for any
goods shipped under a bill of lading containing a carrier beneficiary clause.
See infra note 52. The insurer waived its claim based on this provision. Luck-
enbach, 248 U.S. at 140-41 (argument for petitioners).
40. Luckenbach, 248 U.S. at 146.
41. See infra note 52 (providing example of third party liability clause).
42. See Luckenbach, 248 U.S. at 146.
43. Comment, supra note 2, at 115-16.
44. I& at 116.
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recover from the carrier by suing the carrier.4 Because the
transfer of funds from the insurer to the shipper was a loan
rather than an insurance payment, the carrier's beneficiary
clause did not apply. The shipper thus obtained immediate in-
surance compensation for its loss in the form of a loan, while
retaining a claim against the carrier for the damage caused to
its goods. The insurer would have its loan repaid if the shipper
successfully recovered from the carrier for the value of the
damaged goods.4
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld use of the loan receipt to
promptly compensate the insured without losing the insurer's
subrogation right in Luckenbach v. W. J. McCahan Sugar Re-
fining Co.47 In Luckenbach, the W. J. McCahan Sugar Refining
Company shipped a cargo of sugar from Puerto Rico to Phila-
delphia aboard the Julia Luckenbach, chartered by the Insular
Line.48 The cargo was damaged,49 but the shipper had full in-
surance coverage through the Federal Insurance Company.50
The bills of lading contained carrier beneficiary clauses,51 how-
ever, and the shipper's insurance policy, containing a third
party liability clause, did not cover shipments on such bills of
lading.5 2 The Federal Insurance Company paid on the policy
anyway, using a loan receipt.53
45. Id.
46. See id at 116-17.
47. 248 U.S. 139 (1918).
48. Id at 144.
49. Id
50. Id at 145-47.
51. The bills of lading contained the following carrier beneficiary clause,
giving the carrier the full benefit of the shipper's insurance:
In case of any loss, detriment or damage done to or sustained by said
goods or any part thereof for which the carrier shall be liable to the
shipper, owner or consignee, the carrier shall to the extent of such lia-
bility have the full benefit of any insurance that may have been ef-
fected upon or on account of said goods.
Id at 145-46.
52. The insurance policy contained a third party liability clause providing
that the insurer did not have to pay on the policy until the carrier's liability
had been determined:
Warranted by the assured free from any liability for merchandise in
the possession of any carrier or other bailee, who may be liable for
any loss or damage thereto; and for merchandise shipped under a bill
of lading containing a stipulation that the carrier may have the bene-
fit of any insurance thereon.
Id at 146.
53. Id. at 147. To promptly reimburse the shipper and to avoid losing tha
right of subrogation, the insurer paid on the policy in accordance with the fol-
lowing loan receipt agreement:
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The Court held that payments under loan receipt agree-
ments are legitimate loans rather than payments of insurance,
noting that whether the transfer of money operates as a pay-
ment is determined ordinarily by the intention of the parties to
the transaction.54 The Luckenbach Court considered loan re-
ceipts the ideal solution to the problem posed by carrier benefi-
ciary clauses. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice
Brandeis praised the ingenuity of businesspersons in devising
an arrangement "which is consonant both with the needs of
commerce and the demands of justice."'
Insurers noted the Supreme Court's unqualified approval
of the loan receipt agreement and sought other ways to make
use of the loan receipt.ss One natural use for the loan receipt
Received from the Federal Insurance Company, [$2,304.16], as a loan
and repayable only to the extent of any net recovery we may make
from any carrier... on account of loss to our property ... due to
damage on S/S Julia Luckenbach... and we agree to enter and prose-
cute suit against said ... carrier... on said claim with all due dili-
gence at the expense and under the exclusive direction and control of
the said Federal Insurance Company.
54. IHL at 149-51.
55. I&
56. Parties also use the loan receipt for contingent settlement of claims,
particularly when multiple defendants are involved. See, e.g., Thornton &
Wick, Loan Receipt Agreements: Are They Loans, Settlements, Wagering Con-
tracts, or Unholy Alliances?, 43 INs. COUNS. J. 226, 226 (1976); Annotation, In-
surance: Validity and Effect of Loan Receipt or Agreement between Injured
and Insurer for a Loan Repayable to Extent of Insured's Recovery from An-
other, 13 A.L.R.3D 42, 47 (1967). Devices related to loan receipts have evolved.
See Comment, Gallagher Covenants, Mary Carter Agreements, and Loan Re-
ceipt Agreements: Unsettling Contributions to Conflict Resolution, 1977 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 117, 120-23.
The following cases involve the use of loan receipts in other contexts or by
parties other than insurer and insured. Moore v. Subaru of Am., 891 F.2d 1445,
1450 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that loan receipts are not valid loans when used
to avoid setoff against settlement); Symons v. Mueller Co., 526 F.2d 13, 16
(10th Cir. 1975) (holding that loan receipts do not circumvent rule prohibiting
indemnity between joint tortfeasors); Willamette-W. Corp. v. Columbia Pac.
Towing Co., 466 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that loan receipts are
invalid to circumvent waiver of subrogation rights in contract); Augusta
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 170 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1948) (holding
that insured remains sufficiently interested after executing a loan receipt to
bring action under Federal Tort Claims Act); Aetna Ins. Co. v. United States,
162 F. Supp. 442, 442 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (per curiam) (holding that loan receipt pay-
ment is payment on the policy for tax statute); Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 519 F. Supp. 668, 677 (D. Del. 1981) (holding loan re-
ceipt valid when attorney "loaned" services); Independent School Dist. No. 454
v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1095, 1098-99 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (hold-
ing loan receipt valid between corporation and school district); American
Dredging Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 309 F. Supp. 425, 428-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
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arose in the context of insurer subrogation.
D. LOAN RECEIPTS AND RULE 17(a)
Insurers were dissatisfied that Rule 17(a) required them to
bring suit against the wrongdoer in their own names.57 Insur-
ers believed a jury would be prejudiced against a plaintiff insur-
ance company.s The loan receipt provided an ideal solution to
the dilemma posed by insurers bringing suit in their own
names. The insurer would still pay the policy proceeds, but in
the form of a loan, to be repaid only out of any recovery the
insured may receive from the wrongdoer. As in the case of the
shipper and carrier, the insured would bring suit in its own
name against the wrongdoer. If the loan receipt is upheld as a
valid loan in this context, the insurer avoids joinder as the real
party in interest under Rule 17(a).
Whether the loan receipt is a valid loan or merely a pay-
ment disguised as a loan usually has been the central issue in
cases determining the validity of the device when used to cir-
cumvent Rule 17(a).59 Lower federal courts have aligned them-
selves on both sides of the issue of loan receipt validity.6°
(holding that loan receipt cannot alter right of pro rata contribution between
co-insurers).
This Note addresses only insurers' use of loan receipts to avoid bringing
suit in their own names.
57. Note, supra note 6, at 466.
58. ML at 466. Jury prejudice against insurance companies is often judi-
cially recognized. E.g., White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton In-
dus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd without opinion sub n
Quaglia v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 578 F.2d 1375, and aff'd without
opinion, 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978). In the absence of compelling empirical
evidence, both the existence and the effect of jury prejudice is debatable. Ju-
ries are familiar with insurance. Rather than being prejudiced against plain-
tiff insurers, juries may even be aware that the defendant is also, "in reality,"
an insurance company. See Kennedy, Federal Rule 17(a): Will the Real Party
in Interest Please Stand?, 51 MINN. L. REV. 675, 686 (1967) (noting that modern
juries may assume defendants are insured). For a more thorough discussion of
the effect of jury prejudice, see infra text accompanying notes 131-40.
59. Comment, supra note 2, at 122 n.38 (citing Note, Insurance-The Loan
Receip4 35 WASH. L. REV. 190, 193 (1960)).
60. The courts in the following cases found loan receipts invalid: Execu-
tive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 1974); City
Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lipari v.
Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 87 F.R.D. 730, 731 (W.D. Pa. 1980); F.L. Crane
Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 414, 415-17 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Pace v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 55 F.R.D. 215, 218 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 54 F.R.D. 486, 489 (D. Md. 1972); Neighbours v. Har-
leysville Mut. Casualty Co., 169 F. Supp. 368, 372 (D. Md. 1959).
The courts in the following cases found loan receipts valid: Luckenbach v.
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1. Early Federal Court Decisions: Mechanically Applying
Luckenbach
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in 1938,61 use of loan receipts to circumvent Rule 17(a)
was, of course, not a problem.62 After Rule 17(a) became effec-
tive, a series of circuit court cases upheld the validity of loan
receipts when used by insurers suing the wrongdoer in the
name of the insured.63 These courts typically cited Luckenbach
without offering any other supporting rationale.64 The last in
this series of cases, Ketona Chemical Corp. v. Globe Indemnity
W.J. McCahan Sugar Refining Co., 248 U.S. 139, 148-49 (1918); Frank Briscoe
Co. v. Georgia Sprinkler Co., 713 F.2d 1500, 1502 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983); Blasser
Bros. v. Northern Pan-Am. Line, 628 F.2d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 1980); R.J. En-
strom Corp. v. Interceptor Corp., 520 F.2d 1217, 1219 (10th Cir. 1975); Ketona
Chem. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 404 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1968); Sanders v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 354 F.2d 777, 778 (5th Cir. 1965); In re J.E. Brenneman
Co., 322 F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1963); Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp. v. Lawson, 271
F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1959), cert denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Celanese Corp. of
Am. v. John Clark Indus., 214 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 1954); Dixey v. Federal
Compress & Warehouse Co., 132 F.2d 275, 278 (8th Cir. 1942); First Nat'l Bank
v. Lloyd's of London, 116 F.2d 221, 226 (7th Cir. 1940); Automobile Ins. Co. v.
Springfield Dyeing Co., 109 F.2d 533, 537-38 (3d Cir. 1940); Acro Automation
Sys., Inc. v. Iscont Shipping Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 413, 421-22 (D. Md. 1989); Mc-
Carty v. Maryland Casualty Co., 429 F. Supp. 112,114 (W.D. Ark. 1976); Green-
briar Shopping Center, Inc. v. Lorne Co., 310 F. Supp. 303, 305 (N.D. Ga. 1969),
aff'd, 424 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1970); Watsontown Brick Co. v. Hercules Powder
Co., 201 F. Supp. 343, 344-45 (M.D. Pa. 1962); United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Slifkin, 200 F. Supp. 563, 572-74 (N.D. Ala. 1961); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v.
Coast Mfg. & Supply Co., 185 F. Supp. 910, 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Miller v. Pine
Bluff Hotel Co., 170 F. Supp. 552, 554 (E.D. Ark. 1959); McDowell Assoc. v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F. Supp. 894, 897 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Refined Syrups
& Sugars, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 907, 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Per-
rera v. Smolowitz, 11 F.R.D. 377, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); Williams v. Union Pac.
R.R., 94 F. Supp. 174, 176-77 (D. Neb. 1950); Capo v. C-b Two Fire Equip. Co.,
93 F. Supp. 4, 5 (D.N.J. 1950); Kerna v. Trucking, Inc., 3 F.R.D. 365, 368 (W.D.
Pa. 1944); Price & Pierce, Ltd. v. Jarka Great Lakes Corp., 37 F. Supp. 939, 944
(W.D. Mich. 1941); Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 30 F.
Supp. 412, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
61. See generally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 62 (4th ed.
1983) (discussing the drafting and adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
62. Between the Luckenbach decision in 1918 and adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, parties did advance the argument that the
insurer was the real party. E.g., Wittig v. Canada S.S. Lines, Ltd., 59 F.2d 428,
429-30 (W.D.N.Y. 1932). The federal courts rejected this argument based on
Luckenbach. See, e.g., id,
63. See supra note 60 (citing federal court of appeals cases dating from
1940 to 1968).
64. City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
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Co.,65 illustrates how the federal courts automatically approved
loan receipts used to circumvent Rule 17(a). The Fifth Circuit
held that the insured, Ketona, was the real party in interest
under Rule 17(a), without offering any supporting rationale and
without even citing Luckenbach.6
2. Federal Courts Rejecting Loan Receipt Use to Circumvent
Rule 17(a)
In 1969, the D.C. Circuit decided City Stores Co. v. Lerner
Shops, Inc.67 and created a split among the circuit courts on this
issue for the first time. The City Stores court held that the loan
receipt was a sham agreement designed to evade Rule 17(a),
65. 404 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1968). Ketona involved a dispute over the Com-
prehensive General Liability Policy that Globe Indemnity Company issued to
Ketona Chemical Corporation. A Ketona employee sought recovery for per-
sonal injury sustained while loading a tank car with ammonia Id. at 182-83.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court judgment in holding that Globe's
policy did not cover the employee's injury. Id. at 182.
Ketona had also purchased insurance from Underwriters at Lloyd's of
London. Pursuant to a loan receipt agreement, Lloyd's defended the suit and
paid Ketona's portion of the settlement. Id. at 183.
66. The entire holding is as follows:
We hold that under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)],
Ketona is the real party in interest and the proper party plaintiff.
Sanders v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 354 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1965). See 18
[G. COUCH & R. ANDERSON, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
§ 61:72 (2d ed. 1959); Annotation, Insurance: Validity and Effect of
Loan Receipt or Agreement between Insured and Insurer for a Loan
Repayable to Extent of Insured's Recovery from Another, 13 A.L.R.3D
42 (1967)]. The single Alabama case which has dealt with the question
of the validity of a loan receipt transaction is McKenzie v. North
River Ins. Co., 257 Ala. 265, 58 [So. 2d] 581 (1951), and it is not in
point.
Id at 184.
67. 410 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In this case three companies, including
Lerner Shops, sued City Stores for losses sustained in a fire allegedly caused
by City Stores' negligence. Id. at 1011. Their insurance companies had already
compensated the three companies, using either the following or a substantially
similar loan receipt agreement:
RECEIVED FROM Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company
[$27,890.18], as a loan and repayable only to the extent of any net re-
covery we may make from any person or persons, corporation or cor-
porations, on account of loss by fire to our property on or about
September 7, 1963 or from any insurance effected by such person or
persons, corporation or corporations.
As security for such repayment,... we agree to enter and prose-
cute suit against such person or persons, corporation or corporations
on account of said claim for said loss, with all due diligence, at the ex-
pense and under the exclusive direction and control of said Lumber-
man's Mutual Casualty Company.
Id. at 1011 & n.1.
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and therefore insurance companies should be made parties
plaintiff, as the real parties in interest.68 The court distin-
guished Luckenbach as a situation in which the insurer's liabil-
ity was contingent rather than absolute.69 The court appeared
to argue that, due to the third party liability clause in Lucken-
bach, the contingency of the carrier's liability must be resolved
to determine the insurer's liability.70 City Stores, the insured,
admitted in oral argument that Luckenbach involved contin-
gent, not absolute, liability, but contended that subsequent fed-
eral cases expanded the holding of Luckenbach to cover
situations of absolute liability.71 The D.C. Circuit was unim-
pressed with the other federal cases that cited Luckenbach as
supporting the validity of loan receipt agreements, because they
lacked any other supporting rationale.72
After noting that the insurer sought to avoid suing in its
own name for fear of jury prejudice, the court deemed this "an
unworthy motive, if not an improper and illegal purpose,"
68. Id. at 1015.
69. Id. at 1013.
70. Id.
71. I& at 1014.
72. Id. The court was frank in expressing its disdain toward the other
federal decisions:
We might be impressed by [the] assertion [that federal cases since
the Luckenbach opinion have enlarged its holding] if in the subse-
quent federal decisions the courts had reached their conclusions
through sound and independent reasoning. But, almost without ex-
ception, the district and circuit court cases cited by the appellees up-
holding the use of the loan receipt where the liability of the insurer is
absolute base their holdings upon the Luckenbach case, without any
process of reasoning of their own to justify their expansion of its rul-
ing. This clearly indicated, we think, that the cases cited by the appel-
lees, and others of similar import, were based upon a misapprehension
of the true holding of the Luckenbach decision.
During the half century since it was written, that case has been
often cited by federal district and circuit courts, and almost as often
has been misunderstood. As we have shown, it does not hold that an
insurer whose liability is absolute may pay the claim of an insured
and avoid the consequences of subrogation by calling the payment a
loan and taking a loan receipt from the insured. Consequently, it does
not support the subsequent federal cases which so hold.
Our consideration of this case of first impression is not aided by
the federal cases cited by the appellees which, as we have said, do lit-
tle more than cite the Luckenbach case to support their expansion of
its holding. Decisions of district courts and other courts of appeals
are, of course, not binding on us and are looked to only for their per-
suasive effect. If they fail to persuade by the use of sound and logical
reasoning, they will not be followed, no matter how great their
number.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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which sought to frustrate the enforcement of Rule 17(a). 73 The
court determined that loan receipts are not true loans because
they lack an unconditional promise to pay at some certain time,
they do not provide for interest, and the insured sells the insur-
ance company the right to use the insured's name with the only
consideration to the insured being a possibility of earlier pay-
ment.74 The court considered irrelevant the parties' intention
that the loan receipt be construed a loan because the real pur-
pose was "a bold and bald evasion of a federal rule of practice
and procedure." 7,5 It also noted that some earlier courts had up-
held loan receipts because the defendant had not shown that it
would be prejudiced by the denial of joinder of the insurer as
the real party in interest.7 6 In rejecting this rationale, the court
stated that the burden is on the plaintiff to show why the de-
fendant is not entitled to the benefit of Rule 17(a). 77
Then-Circuit Judge Warren Burger dissented, seeing no
compelling reason why the parties' private agreements should
not be given effect.78 He saw nothing improper in seeking to
have the jury evaluate the case without regard to insurance
coverage.79 Judge Burger explained that the purposes of Rule
17(a) are to enable the defendant to avail itself of all evidence
and defenses it has against the real party in interest and to en-
sure finality of judgment.8 0 Although the majority emphasized
the improper purpose of the plaintiff to circumvent Rule 17(a)
for fear of jury prejudice, Judge Burger considered the defend-
ant's purpose improper in substituting the insurer as plaintiff to
take advantage of any possible jury prejudice.8 ' Furthermore,
73. Id at 1013.
74. IM. at 1014-15.
75. Id at 1015.
76. Id
77. Id.
78. Id at 1015-16 (Burger, J., dissenting).
79. Id. Judge Burger further argued that "there may well be some public
policy served in having the triers decide the issue uninfluenced by the circum-
stance that 'a large insurance company' will pay the bill." Id at 1015.
80. Id at 1016.
81. Id Judge Burger argued that in Celanese Corp. of Am. v. John Clark
Indus., 214 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 1954), the Fifth Circuit recognized defend-
ant's improper purpose in trying to substitute the insurer as plaintiff. City
Stores, 410 F.2d at 1016. The majority responded that the Celanese improper
purpose argument applied equally to the insurer's improper purpose in trying
to remain anonymous. Id at 1015 n.3.
Insurers are not always so concerned about anonymity. In fact, some in-
surers routinely execute loan receipts but then attempt to sue in their own
names; in these cases the device is thus merely a way of insuring their subro-
gation rights. See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. v. M/V Hans Leonhardt, 719 F. Supp. 479,
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Judge Burger would have given effect to the parties' intention
that the loan receipt be construed as a loan despite the loan re-
ceipt's purpose of circumventing Rule 17(a).8 2
The Sixth Circuit followed the City Stores analysis and de-
termined that loan receipts were invalid in the 1974 case of Ex-
ecutive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States.s3 In that case, an
insurer used a loan receipt to compensate its insured for dam-
age to the insured's airplane.84 The court distinguished Luck-
enbach as a case in which liability was contingent, explaining
that the insurer would have incurred liability only if the in-
sured could not recover from the carrier.8s If the insurer had
paid the shipper before the court determined the carrier's lia-
bility, the carrier beneficiary clause would absolve the carrier
of any liability. Although the loan receipt in Luckenbach had
some indicia of a true loan, the court concluded that the trans-
fer of monies in Executive Jet was not a true loan because the
terms of the alleged loan did not require payment of a definite
sum at a definite time and did not assess interest charges, the
amount loaned equaled the amount of the insurance policy, and
the insurer controlled the lawsuit just as it would in the case of
ordinary subrogation.8s The court rejected earlier federal au-
thority as lacking in reasoning, and instead sided with City
500 (E.D. La. 1989); Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Circle Flour Co., 318 F.
Supp. 106, 109 (D. Md. 1970); Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. Associated In-
dep. Dealers, 313 F. Supp. 816, 817 (D. Miinn. 1970); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co., 131 F. Supp. 751, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); cf. In-
gram ex rel. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum, 112 F.
Supp. 430, 431 (M.D. Tenn. 1953) (stating that in the absence of the loan re-
ceipt as an exhibit, the suit would proceed as an ordinary subrogation action).
For a general discussion of the use of loan receipts as subrogation devices that
can allow suit in the name of the insured, see Zipser, The Case of the Loan
Receipt 1948 INs. L.J. 820, 820.
82. City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
83. 507 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1974). In this case, an aircraft owned by Execu-
tive Jet crashed on takeoff due to engine failure caused by ingestion of a large
number of seagulls roosting on the runway. Id. at 510. A group of British in-
surance companies paid Executive Jet, using a loan receipt. Executive Jet
then filed suit against the United States, alleging FAA air traffic controller
negligence by not warning the pilot of the existence of seagulls on the runway.
Id. at 510-11. The court chose not to decide whether the effect of the loan re-
ceipt is governed by federal or state law, because Ohio considered monies
transferred under loan receipts to be payments under the policy, and the court
felt the federal rule should be the same. Id. at 511.
84. I& at 510.
85. Id at 512.
86. IL
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Stores and a later district court case.8 7
3. Recent Federal Cases Supporting Loan Receipts in Rule
17(a) Cases
The courts of appeals resumed rubber stamping Lucken-
bach after the brief hiatus in City Stores and Executive Jet. In
1975, the Tenth Circuit decided R. J. Enstrom Corp. v. Intercep-
tor Corp.,8 holding the loan receipt valid. 9 The court consid-
ered Luckenbach dispositive on the issue of loan receipt
validity, deciding that the insured was the real party in interest
for purposes of Rule 17(a).9 It noted that most federal courts
have followed Luckenbach.9 1 As to whether the loan receipt
constitutes payment, the court considered the issue one of state
subrogation law, not federal procedural law.9 2 Because the rel-
evant state law upheld the validity of loan receipts as loans, the
court determined the insurers were not subrogated on the
claim; that is, the insurer did not have to bring suit in its own
name because it had not made a "payment. '93
The Eleventh Circuit similarly did not address the reason-
ing of City Stores and Executive Jet when it decided Frank
Briscoe Co. v. Georgia Sprinkler Co.94 in 1983. Although the
parties in Frank Briscoe did not dispute the prosecution of the
87. Id. at 512-13. In Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
54 F.R.D. 486 (D. Md. 1972), Babcock supplied steam generating units to Pepco.
Id. at 488-89. The units failed, and Pepco recovered from its two insurers (exe-
cuting a loan receipt agreement), before bringing suit against Babcock. Id-
The district court held that loan receipt agreements are not bona fide loans.
Id at 489.
The court further concluded that both insurers were indispensable parties
under Rule 19, even though this required the court to then dismiss the action
because joinder of the missing insurance company would have resulted in lack
of complete diversity of citizenship. Id at 491.
88. 520 F.2d 1217 (10th Cir. 1975). RJ. Enstrom, like Executive Jet, in-
volved an airplane crash. The insurer, Lloyd's of London, paid the claim by
loan receipt agreement. Id at 1217-18.
89. Id at 1219.
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id. But see supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing whether
state or federal law governs).
93. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 520 F.2d at 1219-20.
94. 713 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1983). Frank Briscoe was under contract to
construct a federal government building. The company entered into a subcon-
tract with Georgia Sprinkler for installation of a fire-prevention system. Geor-
gia Sprinkler's sprinkler system leaked, causing damage to the building.
Frank Briscoe's insurer paid Frank Briscoe, executing a loan receipt agree-
ment. Id. at 1501.
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suit in the insured's name, the court upheld the validity of the
loan receipt in a footnote lacking any supporting rationale, but
simply citing R J. Enstrom and Ketona.95
The most recent case to address loan receipt validity is the
federal district court case of Acro Automation Systems, Inc. v.
Iscont Shipping Ltd.96 Acro Automation Systems (Acro)
bought laser welding equipment from a manufacturer in Israel
and hired Bekins High Technologies International (Bekins
HiTech) to arrange shipment from Israel to Acro in Milwau-
kee.97 After being handled by several shippers, the equipment
arrived in damaged condition. Acro submitted a claim to its in-
surer, Insurance Company of North America (INA), for the
cost of the goods less the salvage value.98 Instead of paying the
insurance proceeds outright, INA "loaned" the money to Acro
under a "loan and trust receipt."99 Acro then sued Bekins
HiTech for damages in the amount paid to Acro under its insur-
95. The footnote reads:
Where an insurance company as subrogee has paid an entire loss
suffered by the insured it is the only real party in interest and must
sue in its own name. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338
U.S. 366, 380-81 (1949). When a loan receipt is utilized, however, the
insured retains a sufficient interest so as not to displace him as the
real party in interest under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)].
[R.J. Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor Corp., 520 F.2d 1217 (10th Cir.
1975); Ketona Chem. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 404 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.
1968); American Chain & Cable Co. v. Brunson, 157 Ga. App. 833, 278
S.E.2d 833 (1981)].
Id. at 1502 n.1.
96. 706 F. Supp. 413 (D. Md. 1989).
97. Id. at 414.
98. Id at 414. Acro paid $400,000 for the equipment, which had a salvage
value of $147,890; thus Acro lost $252,110 and claimed this amount as damages.
Id
99. The loan receipt provided-
The undersigned [Acro] hereby acknowledge(s) receipt of
$251,610 from Insurance Company of North America as a loan with-
out interest (not a payment) repayable solely out of the net proceeds
of any recovery of the property mentioned below, and out of any net
recovery made against any carrier, bailee, insurer, or other third party
liable for the loss mentioned below;, and as trustee(s) of an express
trust the undersigned agree(s) to hold in trust for said Insurance
Company all such property and monies so recovered, and all rights of
action for the recovery thereof.
Id. at 419-20. The loan receipt gave INA full control of the litigation, stating:
[Tihe undersigned [Acro] hereby irrevocably appoint(s) said Insurance
Company [INA] as agent and attorney-in-fact of the undersigned with
full power to collect, enforce, compromise, release and dispose of such
property, claims and recoveries through attorneys and representatives
of the said Insurance Company's own selection, by legal proceedings
or otherwise, all in the name and with the full cooperation of the un-
dersigned, but at the sole expense of the Insurance Company; and the
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ance policy with INA.i°°
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland upheld
the validity of the loan receipt agreement in Acro. 0' The court
undersigned undertakes to execute such documents as may be neces-
sary to carry out the purpose hereof.
I& at 420.
100. Id. at 414.
101. Id. at 420. The court denied Bekins' motion to add INA as the real
party in interest, holding that the loan receipt agreement, intended to circum-
vent Rule 17(a), did not frustrate the policies of the Rule. Id-
The court also discussed the validity of the carrier's limitation of liability
clause in the bill of lading, which reduced the damages recoverable to $1.25 per
pound or, in this case, only $24,000. The court first noted that the Interstate
Commerce Act permitted limitation of liability, but the shipper must deliber-
ately choose to limit liability. Id at 415-16. Acro did not choose to limit the
carrier's liability because it did not sign the limitation of liability agreement in
the bill of lading, and Bekins Van Lines did not deliver the bill of lading prior
to shipment of the laser welding equipment. Id. at 416-17. By accepting the
equipment and paying, Acro did not deliberately choose to limit the carrier's
liability because the bill of lading recited a flat fee rather than a choice of
rates, when one rate would have been with the limitation of liability and the
other without. Id. at 418-19. Finally, in an alternative holding, the court noted
that the limitation of liability could apply only to Bekins Van Lines, because
Bekins Forwarding and Bekins HiTech did not hold the ICC license that per-
mits carriers to take advantage of the section of the Interstate Commerce Act
providing for limitation of liability. Id. at 419.
At first glance, the limitation of liability agreement in Acro seems similar
to the carrier beneficiary clause in Luckenbach. The limitation of liability
agreement, however, does not affect the substantive rights of the parties in the
same manner as a carrier beneficiary clause. Under the carrier beneficiary
clause, an insurance payment from the insurer to the shipper effectively extin-
guished the claim of the shipper against the carrier. See supra note 29 and ac-
companying text. Under a limitation of liability agreement, the carrier limits
its liability to an amount based on the weight of the goods shipped rather than
the value of the goods damaged. E.g., Acro, 706 F. Supp. at 414. Thus, if the
insurer pays the shipper the amount of the damaged goods, the insurer be-
comes subrogated only to the limited claim based on the weight of the goods
shipped. See 16 G. CoucH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, supra note 8, § 61:116,
at 186. In this situation, executing a loan receipt agreement does not help the
insurer recover the full value of the damaged goods from the carrier, because
the carrier's liability is not contingent on whether the shipper is insured. The
carrier is liable to the shipper (or to the insurer as the shipper's subrogee)
only for the limited amount based on the weight of the goods shipped.
The court decided Acro without mentioning Potomac Elec. Power Co. v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 54 F.R.D. 486 (D. Md. 1972). In 1972 the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland firmly asserted in Potomac that "[a] pay-
ment [under a loan receipt agreement] conditioned on such control by an in-
surance company and its attorneys of a subsequent suit hardly amounts to a
bona fide loan so as to avoid the requirements of Rules 17 and 19." I& at 489.
At that time, the court opposed loan receipt agreements so vigorously that it
required joinder of the insurer even though the case then had to be dismissed
for lack of diversity jurisdiction. See supra note 87. Yet in Acro, the court felt
compelled to uphold the loan receipt agreement "[blecause to hold otherwise
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first looked to Ketona, 1. J. Enstrom, Frank Briscoe, City
Stores, and Executive Jet to determine the state of the law. Be-
cause the circuits were split and the Fourth Circuit had not
ruled on loan receipt validity, the court examined the policy be-
hind Rule 17(a). 0 2
The Acro court reiterated the two often-cited purposes of
Rule 17(a): to enable a defendant to avail itself of all defenses
and evidence it has against the real party in interest, and to en-
sure finality of judgment. 0 3 The court noted that the defend-
ants had not suggested they had defenses against INA that they
could not assert against Acro. 0 4 Furthermore, the defendants
could conduct discovery against INA. The court noted also that
the Supreme Court had decided in Montana v. United States0 5
that "[w]hen a non-party assumes control of a party's litigation,
the non-party is precluded from relitigating the claims litigated
in the first action."' 06 Because INA had full control of the liti-
gation under the terms of the loan receipt agreement, INA
would be bound by the decision rendered to Acro. The court
thus found no violation of the policy behind Rule 17(a) in not
substituting INA as the real party in interest.0 7
Finding no compelling policy reason to apply Rule 17(a),
the court enforced the contractual intent of Acro and INA as
expressed in the loan receipt agreement. 08 According to the
court, because the issue of insurance was "concededly irrele-
vant," the plaintiff should be protected from any disclosure to
the jury of the insurer's role as the real party in interest109
The Acro court concluded that the defendant's purpose in seek-
ing joinder of an insurance company must be to prejudice the
jury."0
would provide a foreign and unwelcome influence on plaintiff's case." Acro,
706 F. Supp. at 422; see also Neighbours v. Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co., 169
F. Supp. 368, 372 (D. Md. 1959) (requiring insurer to be joined despite use of
loan receipt).
102. Acro, 706 F. Supp. at 420.
103. Id.; see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
104. Acro, 706 F. Supp. at 420.
105. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
106. Acro, 706 F. Supp. at 420 (citing Montana, 440 U.S. at 154).
107. Id. at 420-21.
108. Id. at 421.
109. I&
110. Id- (citing City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1015-16
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J., dissenting)); see supra text accompanying notes
79-82. The defendants in Acro also moved that INA be joined under FED. R.
CrV. P. 19(a) as a person to be joined if feasible. The court noted that the advi-
sory committee note states that the purpose of Rule 19(a) is to ensure finality
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II. LOAN RECEIPT AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT
AFFECT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
A. LMIT LUCKENBACH TO ITS FACTS
The loan receipt evolved from the interaction of insured,
carrier, and insurer. L Under a carrier beneficiary clause, the
insurer effectively loses its subrogation right." 2 If the insurer
pays on the policy, that payment nullifies the shipper's claim
against the carrier, and therefore the insurer has no subrogated
claim. Insurers responded by including third party liability
clauses in insurance policies, which made the insurer's liability
on the policy contingent upon prior determination of the liabil-
ity of any third parties to the insured." 3
To illustrate this point, return to the hypothetical case of
Jones, Bob's Shipping, and America's Largest. Suppose Jones'
policy with America's Largest contained a third-party liability
provision. Under this provision, America's Largest could prop-
erly delay payment until Jones' suit against Bob's Shipping was
settled or went to judgment. In this hypothetical, Jones would
certainly appreciate payment under a loan receipt, allowing her
the immediate recovery one expects from insurance. Jones also
would probably never insure with America's Largest again if it
continued to issue policies with third party liability provisions.
With this in mind, one discovers the importance of distin-
guishing Luckenbach from cases in which a party used loan re-
ceipts to circumvent Rule 17(a), such as City Stores and
Executive Jet."4 The loan receipt in Luckenbach had a valid
purpose; the insurer was able to promptly compensate the ship-
per without losing its right to subrogation. When the loan re-
ceipt is used in contexts that do not involve the contingent
liability created by third party liability clauses, however, the
loan receipt is deceptive. It no longer serves the business pur-
poses that Justice Brandeis praised;" 5 it serves only the inter-
est of the insurer in not bringing suit in its own name. Thus,
Luckenbach should be limited to cases involving insurance poli-
cies expressly stating that payment is contingent upon prior de-
of judgment. The court had already rejected this policy argument when ex-
plaining Rule 17(a), so it denied joinder under 19(a). . at 422.
111. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
112. See supra text accompanying note 29.
113. See supra text accompanying note 38.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 69, 86.
115. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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termination of any third paries' liability to the insured for
damages related to the insurance claim.
B. PROCEEDS RECEIVED UNDER LOAN RECEIPTS ARE NOT
VALID LOANS
The courts in City Stores and Executive Jet argued convinc-
ingly that loan receipts are not loans because they do not pro-
vide for definite payment at a definite time, nor for interest.116
The other courts do not answer these concerns, nor do they ex-
plain what the insured receives as consideration for entering
into the agreement, the third factor the City Stores court cited
as characteristic of a true loan."17
Examination of the typical loan receipt agreement, as in
the original hypothetical, reveals that the insured receives no
consideration for entering into the agreement. Although exe-
cuting the loan receipt agreement purportedly frees the insured
of the expense of litigation by giving the insurer control of the
subsequent lawsuit," 8 the insurer gains this control and as-
sumes this expense through subrogation even in the absence of
any agreement." 9 Through the loan receipt, the insurer gains
the right to bring suit in the name of the insured, while the in-
sured receives nothing to which it was not already entitled. In
the usual case, the insurer is liable on the insurance policy, and
the insured is entitled to prompt payment whether or not it
agrees to enter into a loan receipt agreement.
In Luckenbach, the insurer was not liable until the car-
rier's liability was determined. 2 0 The insured benefited from
entering the loan receipt agreement because it received prompt
payment to which it was not otherwise entitled.121 The insurer
benefited by gaining control of the insured's litigation against
116. See supra text accompanying notes 75, 86. Similar criteria for loan va-
lidity are used in tax cases involving disputes whether money transfers from
individuals to corporations are valid loans or actually capital investments. See,
e.g., Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
aff'd, 555 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1977); Santa Anita Consol. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.
536, 550 (1968).
117. City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
118. For examples of loan receipts giving the insurer control of the subse-
quent litigation, see supra notes 53, 67.
119. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying
note 86.
120. Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Refining Co., 248 U.S. 139, 149
(1918).
121. I&
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the carrier without subrogation. 22 These mutual benefits ar-
guably supply consideration for the loan.123 Thus, when the in-
surer's liability is contingent, as in Luckenbach, there is at least
some indication of a true loan, despite the lack of any provision
for definite payment at a definite time and for interest.24 Loan
receipts used solely to circumvent Rule 17(a), on the other
hand, lack indicia of a true loan.
C. THE PoLcmS BEHIND RULE 17(a)
Rather than examining Luckenbach and whether monies
transferred under loan receipt agreements are truly loans, the
Acro court adopted the rationale of Judge Burger's dissent in
City Stores and rested its decision entirely on policy grounds.2 5
The court focused on defenses that can be used only against the
real party in interest, and on the issue of finality of judg-
ment.126 Although these are important policy considerations,
there are other relevant policies. When Rule 17(a) was first
promulgated, Congress opted for the rule in equity, recognizing
the insurer's subrogation right, rather than the provision at law
that did not recognize insurer's subrogation rights.'27 Because
Rule 17(a) requires suit in the name of the real party in inter-
est, one can infer that the drafters of Rule 17(a) did not want to
introduce the legal fiction that the insured maintains a pecuni-
ary interest in the outcome of the subrogated suit.28 Decisions
upholding the loan receipt have the opposite result. No one dis-
putes that the insurer is truly the real party in interest because
only the insurer stands to profit from the lawsuit.129 By al-
lowing a private agreement to circumvent Rule 17(a), a court
perpetuates the legal fiction that the insured maintains a pecu-
niary interest in the suit, which is contrary to the policy of
Rule 17(a).
122. Id. at 147.
123. Cf. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 508, 512 (6th
Cir. 1974) (stating that when the insurer's liability is contingent there is at
least some indication of a true loan).
124. Id.
125. Acro Automation Sys., Inc. v. Iscont Shipping Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 413,
421 (D. Md. 1989); see supra text accompanying notes 103-10.
126. See supra text accompanying note 103.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
128. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. One commentator has sug-
gested that if insurers should not be the real parties in interest, the legislature
changing the real-party-in-interest rule is preferable to the courts creating a
legal fiction. Kessner, supra note 15, at 466.
129. See supra note 10.
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Whether or not the policy behind Rule 17(a) is violated by
not substituting the insurer as the real party in interest, the
text of the Rule is violated. The Acro court, without explana-
tion, circumvented the established interpretation of Rule 17(a)
- that the insurer is the real party in interest - in favor of
policy reasons that are not expressed in the text of the Rule.
Somehow the court shifted to the defendant the burden of
proving why it should be allowed to use Rule 17(a). 30 Rule
17(a) operates to expose the fact that the insurer is the real
plaintiff; thus the insurer has an improper purpose in seeking
anonymity.131 Even if the equities truly were balanced between
the defendant's improper purpose in trying to expose plaintiff's
insurance and plaintiff's improper purpose in trying to circum-
vent a rule of civil procedure, the logical presumption still
would be in favor of the Rule, which presumably already bal-
ances these equities.
D. JURY PREJUDICE
The Acro court probably required the defendant to demon-
strate why it should be allowed to use Rule 17(a) because of its
concern that jury prejudice against insurance companies would
cause unjust results in the imderlying suit between the insurer
and the carrier. 32 To an impartial observer, this concern seems
more important than the defendant's interest in taking advan-
tage of a procedural rule. The court, however, never presents
empirical justification for its notion of jury prejudice. In the
absence of empirical data, one is left only with common sense
arguments1 33
On one hand, jurors may not like insurance companies;134
130. Acro Automation Sys., Inc. v. Iscont Shipping, Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 413,
420-21 (D. M&. 1989); see supra text accompanying note 107. But see supra text
accompanying note 77 (noting that burden is on plaintiff to show why the
court should not allow defendant to use Rule 17(a)).
131. See supra note 81.
132. See supra text accompanying note 110.
133. Courts that have analyzed the potential effect of jury prejudice against
plaintiff insurers have concluded that it is not significant. Cf. Smith v. Earp,
449 F. Supp. 503, 506-07 (W.D. Ky. 1978) (rejecting jury prejudice argument
against joinder of insurer in motor vehicle accident case because "no-fault" in-
surance is a matter of common knowledge); Pace v. General Elec. Co., 55
F.R.D. 215, 218-19 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (arguing that jurors are not prejudiced
against insurance companies).
134. See 18 G. CoucH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, supra note 8, § 78:30, at
496-97. For discussions noting that these general principles do not apply well
in the case of insurer subrogation (plaintiff insurance companies), see Ken-
nedy, supra note 58, at 714-15; Broeder, The Pro and Con of Interjecting Plain-
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on the other hand, jurors probably have no great sympathy for
the defendants in these cases either.13 For example, in Acro
the defendants were eleven international shipping compa-
nies,'L and the parties disputed neither the fact that the goods
were damaged nor the monetary value of that damage.137 In
that case, jury prejudice was unlikely to have an effect because
the only choice in determining the cause of the damage was be-
tween defendant's negligence and some sort of natural disaster.
Rather than acting on enmity toward the plaintiff insurer, ju-
rors might even be sophisticated enough to know that interna-
tional shipping companies are insured too.1z3
As a general proposition, jury prejudice against insurance
companies would seem to be more relevant when the insurance
company is a defendant.139 Juries probably award excessive
damages based on deep-pocket theories.14 When an insurance
company sits as plaintiff, however, the issue is not whether the
damages awarded will be excessive, but whether the jury will
award any damages. Given insurance companies' generally con-
servative nature in paying claims, the insured almost certainly
will have a great deal of proof for its claim. The insurer will
present the same proof of damages to the jury that the insured
presented to the insurer. The insurer is merely asking the jury
to assign a culpable party. Again, jury prejudice against insur-
ance companies as plaintiff must operate within a very narrow
tiff Insurance Companies in Jury Trial Cases: An Isolated Jury Project Case
Study, 6 NAT. RESOuRcES J. 269, 276-82 (1966); Kessner, supra note 15, at 454-
55; Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Rule: A Plea for Its Abolition, 32
N.Y.U. L. REV. 926, 943-44 (1957).
135. For an example of a large defendant corporation asserting that the
jury will be prejudiced against it, see Pace v. General Elec. Co., 55 F.R.D. 215,
218-19 (W.D. Pa. 1972). The Pace court rejected this argument, along with the
argument that jurors are prejudiced against plaintiff insurers. Id.
136. The full list of defendants was as follows: Iscont Shipping Ltd.; Timur
Carriers (Private) Ltd.; Trans Freight Lines, Inc.; Navifonds N.R. 10;
Seeschiffanlagegesellschaft; Engler Beteil Ingungs-GmbH & Co.; Baltimore
Shipping Co., Inc.; Bekins Van Lines Co.; The Primary Source for Transp.,
Inc.; Bekins Forwarding Co., Inc.; and Maher Terminals, Inc. Bekins HiTech
served as an umbrella organization for Bekins Van Lines and Bekins Forward-
ing. Acro Automation Sys., Inc. v. Iscont Shipping Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 413, 414
(D. Md. 1989).
137. Id. at 415.
138. See Kennedy, supra note 58, at 686.
139. After first finding that jurors generally disfavor insurance companies,
Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 754
(1959), one commentator subsequently found that joinder of a plaintiff insurer
actually benefited the plaintiff insured. Broeder, supra note 134, at 276-83.
140. 18 G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, supra note 8, § 78:30, at 497.
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range, because even strong jury prejudice cannot overcome
clear evidence. In the event jury prejudice causes injustice, the
court can overturn an erroneous jury verdict under Rule
50(b).141
CONCLUSION
The validity of loan receipt agreements has been an ongo-
ing controversy in the twenty years since City Stores created a
split among the circuits. The better-reasoned cases hold that
loan receipts are invalid; the insurer remains the real party in
interest and must bring suit in its own name. Courts should
not use vague concerns about jury prejudice and the policies be-
hind Rule 17(a) to circumvent the clear text of the Rule. Insur-
ance companies must stand as the real party in interest unless,
as in Luckenbach, there is a valid independent reason to allow
the insured to be the named plaintiff. Luckenbach, the
landmark case holding loan receipts valid, should be limited to
its facts. The Supreme Court and the circuits that have not yet
spoken on this issue should follow City Stores and Executive Jet
and hold that loan receipts are invalid when used to circumvent
Rule 17(a), thus generally requiring insurers to sue in their
own names as real parties in interest.
E. Michael Johnson
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
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